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Abstract—An increasing number of Internet of Things (IoT)
devices are connecting to the Internet, yet many of these devices
are fundamentally insecure, exposing the Internet to a variety
of attacks. Botnets such as Mirai have used insecure consumer
IoT devices to conduct distributed denial of service (DDoS)
attacks on critical Internet infrastructure. This motivates
the development of new techniques to automatically detect
consumer IoT attack traffic. In this paper, we demonstrate
that using IoT-specific network behaviors (e.g. limited number
of endpoints and regular time intervals between packets) to
inform feature selection can result in high accuracy DDoS de-
tection in IoT network traffic with a variety of machine learning
algorithms, including neural networks. These results indicate
that home gateway routers or other network middleboxes could
automatically detect local IoT device sources of DDoS attacks
using low-cost machine learning algorithms and traffic data
that is flow-based and protocol-agnostic.
Keywords-Internet of Things; Anomaly Detection; DDoS;
Machine Learning; Feature Engineering
I. INTRODUCTION
The number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices is pro-
jected to grow from 8 billion in 2017 to 20 billion in 2020
[1]. Yet, many of these IoT devices are fundamentally inse-
cure. One analysis of 10 currently popular IoT devices found
250 vulnerabilities, including open telnet ports, outdated
Linux firmware, and unencrypted transmission of sensitive
data [2], [3].
The proliferation of insecure IoT devices has resulted
in a surge of IoT botnet attacks on Internet infrastructure.
In October 2016, the Mirai botnet commanded 100,000
IoT devices (primarily CCTV cameras) to conduct a dis-
tributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against Dyn DNS
infrastructure [4]. Many popular websites, including Github,
Amazon, Netflix, Twitter, CNN, and Paypal, were rendered
inaccessible for several hours. In January 2017, the Mirai
source code was publicly released; DDoS attacks using
Mirai-derived IoT botnets have since increased in frequency
and severity [5].
This growing threat motivates the development of new
techniques to identify and block attack traffic from IoT
botnets. Recent anomaly detection research has shown the
promise of machine learning (ML) for identifying malicious
Internet traffic [6]. Yet, little effort has been made to engi-
neer ML models with features specifically geared towards
IoT device networks or IoT attack traffic. Fortunately, how-
ever, IoT traffic is often distinct from that of other Internet
connected devices (e.g. laptops and smart phones) [7]. For
example, IoT devices often communicate with a small finite
set of endpoints rather than a large variety of web servers.
IoT devices are also more likely to have repetitive network
traffic patterns, such as regular network pings with small
packets at fixed time intervals for logging purposes.
Building on this observation, we develop a machine learn-
ing pipeline that performs data collection, feature extraction,
and binary classification for IoT traffic DDoS detection. The
features are designed to capitalize on IoT-specific network
behaviors, while also leveraging network flow characteristics
such as packet length, inter-packet intervals, and protocol.
We compare a variety of classifiers for attack detection, in-
cluding random forests, K-nearest neighbors, support vector
machines, decision trees, and neural networks.
Given the lack of public datasets of consumer IoT attack
traffic, we generate classifier training data by simulating a
consumer IoT device network. We set up a local network
comprised of a router, some popular consumer IoT devices
for benign traffic, and some adversarial devices performing
DoS attacks. Our classifiers successfully identify attack
traffic with an accuracy higher than 0.999. We found that
random forest, K-nearest neighbors, and neural net classifiers
were particularly effective. We expect that deep learning
classifiers will continue to be effective with additional data
from real-world deployments.
Our pipeline is designed to operate on network mid-
dleboxes (e.g. routers, firewalls, or network switches) to
identify anomalous traffic and corresponding devices that
may be part of an ongoing botnet. The pipeline is flow-
based, stateless, and protocol-agnostic; therefore, it is well
suited for deployment on consumer home gateway routers
or ISP-controlled switches. To our knowledge, this is the
first network anomaly detection framework to focus on IoT-
specific features, as well as the first to apply anomaly
detection specifically to IoT botnets at the local network
level.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
4.
04
15
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
1 A
pr
 20
18
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this section, we present a brief background on network
anomaly detection and middlebox limitations.
A. Network Anomaly Detection
Anomaly detection aims to identify patterns in data that
do not conform to expected behavior. In the context of our
work, anomaly detection techniques may be used to discern
attack traffic from regular traffic. Simple threshold-based
techniques are prone to incorrectly classifying normal traffic
as anomalous traffic and are unable to adapt to the evolving
nature of attacks [6]. More sophisticated anomaly detection
algorithms, particularly those using machine learning, can
help minimize false positives. Such approaches include deep
neural networks, which promise to outperform traditional
machine learning techniques for sufficiently large datasets.
Anomaly detection has long been used in network in-
trusion detection systems (NIDS) for detecting unwanted
behavior in non-IoT networks. The NIDS literature can
therefore inform the choice of anomaly detection methods
for IoT networks. In particular, the literature suggests near-
est neighbor classifiers [8], support vector machines [9],
and rule-based schemes like decision trees and random
forests [10], [11] as promising approaches.
Although there are parallels between NIDS and IoT
botnet detection, there has been little work tailoring anomaly
detection specifically for IoT networks. Our underlying
hypothesis is that IoT traffic is different from other types
of network behavior. For example, while laptops and smart
phones access a large number of web endpoints due to web
browsing activity, IoT devices tend to send automated pings
to a finite number of endpoints. IoT devices also tend to
have a fixed number of states, so their network activity is
more predictable and structured. For instance, a smart light
bulb could have three states: “On,” “Off”, and “Connecting
to Wi-Fi,” each with distinctive network traffic patterns.
This hypothesis is supported by the literature. Apthorpe et
al. demonstrate how the finite states of consumer IoT devices
can actually be reflected in the repeated temporal structures
of send/receive traffic rates; this can even be used to in-
fer consumer usage behaviors [7]. Similarly, the SCADA
anomaly detection literature notes the unique network traffic
patterns of sensors and controllers in infrastructure systems
[12], [13]. Miettinen et al. further show how machine
learning techniques can leverage the unique patterns of IoT
network traffic for similar tasks, such as device identification
[14]. Therefore, we use network traffic features that capture
IoT-specific behaviors to better model IoT DoS attack traffic
for anomaly detection.
B. Network Middlebox Limitations
Network middleboxes have limited memory and process-
ing power, imposing constraints on the algorithmic tech-
niques used for anomaly detection. The literature contains
suggestions for how to meet these constraints. For example,
Sivanathan et al. investigated the use of software defined
networks to monitor network traffic at flow-level granular-
ity [15]. Their work suggests that using flow-based features
can be effective in detecting security threats without incur-
ring the high cost of deep-packet inspection. An anomaly
detection framework for a consumer smart home gateway
router should therefore have the following characteristics:
• Lightweight Features. Routers must handle high band-
width traffic, so any features generated must be
lightweight [16]. In order for an algorithm to scale
to high bandwidth application, a given algorithm must
rely on network flow statistics (how packets are sent) as
opposed to deep packet inspection (what is in a packet).
• Protocol Agnostic Features. Routers must process pack-
ets from a variety of protocols (e.g. TCP, UDP, HTTP,
etc.), so the algorithm must consider packet features
shared by all protocols.
• Low Memory Implementation. Routers are only able
to maintain limited state due to memory constraints;
caching adds latency and complexity. Thus, an optimal
algorithm is either stateless or requires storing flow
information over short time windows only [15].
III. THREAT MODEL
Our threat model (Fig. 1a) makes various assumptions
about consumer IoT networks. We assume the network
includes an on-path device, such as a home gateway router or
other middlebox, that can observe traffic between consumer
IoT devices on the local network (e.g. a smart home LAN)
and the rest of the Internet. The device at this observation
point can inspect, store, manipulate, and block any network
traffic that crosses its path. All traffic between WiFi devices
on the LAN or from devices to the Internet traverses this
middlebox.
Our goal is to detect and prevent DoS attack traffic
originating from devices within the smart home LAN. The
DoS victim may be another device on the LAN or elsewhere
on the Internet. Any device connected to the middlebox
can send both network and attack traffic within the same
time period. Each device is also capable of conducting a
variety of different DoS attacks in series, and successive
attacks can vary in duration. This reflects how a remote
botnet command and control (C&C) may change orders. We
assume that the time range of DoS attacks are roughly 1.5
minutes, a common duration for DoS attacks attempting to
avoid detection [5].
IV. ANOMALY DETECTION PIPELINE
In this section, we present a machine learning DDoS
detection framework for IoT network traffic. Our anomaly
detection pipeline has four steps (Fig. 2):
1) Traffic Capture. The traffic capture process records the
source IP address, source port, destination IP address,
(a) Threat model
(b) Experiment setup
Figure 1: Consumer IoT network threat model and corre-
sponding experiment setup for collecting normal and DoS
attack traffic training data.
destination port, packet size, and timestamp of all IP
packets sent from smart home devices.
2) Grouping of Packets by Device and Time. Packets from
each IoT device are separated by source IP address.
Packets from each device are further divided into non-
overlapping time windows by timestamps recorded at
the middlebox.
3) Feature Extraction. Stateless and stateful features are
generated for each packet based on domain knowledge
of IoT device behavior. The stateless features are
predominantly packet header fields, while the stateful
features are aggregate flow information over very short
time windows, requiring limited memory to support
on-router deployment. (Section IV-B).
4) Binary Classification. K-nearest neighbors, random
forests, decision trees, support vector machines, and
deep neural networks can differentiate normal traffic
from DoS attack traffic with high accuracy (Sec-
tion V-A).
A. Traffic Collection
We set up a experimental consumer IoT device network
to collect realistic benign and malicious IoT device traf-
fic (Fig. 1b). We configured a Raspberry Pi v3 as a WiFi
access point to act as a middlebox. We then connected a YI
Home Camera [17] and Belkin WeMo Smart Switch [18] to
the Raspberry Pi’s WiFi network. A Withings Blood Pressure
Monitor was also connected by Bluetooth to an Android
smartphone associated with the WiFi network [19].
To collect normal (non-DoS) traffic, we interacted with
all three IoT devices for 10 minutes and recorded pcap
files, logging all packets sent during that time period. We
performed many interactions that would occur during regular
device use, including streaming video from the YI camera to
the server in HD and RD modes, turning the WeMo Smart
Switch on/off and installing firmware updates, collecting
blood pressure measurements from the Withing’s Blood
Pressure monitor, and sending the measurements to a cloud
server for storage. We then filtered out all non-IoT traffic
from the pcap recordings, including background traffic
from the Android phone.
Collecting DoS traffic was more challenging. To avoid
the security risks and complexity of running the real Mirai
botnet code, we simulated the three most common classes
of DoS attacks a Mirai-infected device will run: a TCP SYN
flood, a UDP flood, and a HTTP GET flood [5]. We used
a Kali Linux virtual machine running on a laptop as the
DoS source, and a Raspberry Pi 2 running an Apache Web
Server as the DoS victim. We connected both devices via
WiFi to our Raspberry Pi 3 access point. The DoS source
then targeted the victim’s IP address with each class of
DoS attack for approximately 1.5 minutes each. The access
point recorded PCAPs of the attack traffic using the Linux
dumpcap tool. The HTTP GET Flood was simulated using
the Goldeneye tool [20]. The TCP SYN Flood and UDP
Flood were simulated using Kali Linux’s hping3 utility [21].
We then combined the DoS traffic with the normal traffic,
spoofing source IP addresses, MAC addresses, and packet
send times to make it appear as if the IoT devices simulta-
neously produced normal traffic and conducted DoS attacks.
Each of the three IoT devices appeared to execute each
of the three DoS attack classes once within a 10 minute
internal. The attacks occurred in a random order for a
random duration ranging uniformly from 90 to 110 seconds
each. Thus, we collected roughly 300 seconds (5 minutes) of
attack traffic per device. The distribution of attacks between
devices was independent.
This process produced a dataset of 491,855 packets,
comprised of 459,565 malicious packets and 32,290 benign
packets.
B. Feature Engineering
We explore two classes of features and analyze why they
are relevant to differentiating normal and attack IoT traffic.
Stateless features can be derived from flow-independent
characteristics of individual packets. These features are
generated without splitting the incoming traffic stream by
Figure 2: IoT DDoS detection pipeline.
IP source. Thus, these features are the most lightweight.
Stateful features capture how network traffic evolves over
time. There is inherent overhead in generating these features,
as we split the network traffic into streams by device
and divide the per-device streams into time windows. The
time windows serve as a simple time-series representation
of the devices’ evolving network behavior. These features
require aggregating statistics over multiple packets in a time
window; the middlebox performing classification must retain
state, but the amount of state can be limited by using short
(e.g. 10-second) time windows.
1) Stateless Features:
Packet Size: The distribution of packet sizes differs
significantly between attack and normal traffic (Fig. 3a).
Over 90% of attack packets are under 100 bytes, while
normal packets vary between 100 and 1,200 bytes. A device
conducting a DoS attack, such as a TCP SYN Flood, is
trying to open as many connection request as possible with
the victim to exhaust the victim server’s resources. Thus,
an attacker wants to keep the size of the packets as small
as possible in order to maximize the number of connection
requests per second. In comparison, normal traffic can range
from simple server pings indicating that the device is active
(small packets) to video streaming data (large packets).
Inter-packet Interval: Normal IoT traffic has limited
burstiness (Fig. 3b-d). Most packets are sent at regular inter-
vals with appreciable time between packets. This may reflect
IoT network pings or other automated network activities. In
contrast, a vast majority of DoS attack traffic has close to
zero inter-packet intervals (∆T ) and high first and second
derivatives of inter-packet intervals. Using ∆T , d∆Tdt , and
d2∆T
dt2 as features allows a classifier to capitalize on this
difference between normal and DoS traffic.
Protocol: Normal and DoS attack traffic also have
varying protocol distributions (Fig. 3e-f). UDP packets out-
number TCP packets in normal traffic by almost a factor
of three due to UDP video streaming. In comparison, TCP
packets outnumber UDP packets in attack trafic by almost
the same ratio. Attack traffic also includes fewer protocols
in total. We capture protocol differences in a feature with
a one-hot encoding of the three most popular attack proto-
cols (IS TCP, IS UDP, and IS HTTP) and another binary
indicator to reflect all other types of protocols (IS OTHER).
This captures the most popular protocols while minimizing
noise and unnecessary dimensionality associated with less
relevant protocols.
2) Stateful Features:
Bandwidth: The literature contains evidence that
bandwidth usage can be used to characterize network traffic
patterns of IoT devices. For example, Apthorpe et al. were
able to characterize consumer IoT device usage patterns
from send/receive rates, but dividing network traffic by
source device was necessary for the analysis [7]. Similarly,
our pipeline splits network traffic by source device and
calculates the average bandwidth within 10-second time
windows to measure the instantaneous bandwidth associated
with each device. There are minor distributional differences
in bandwidth usage between the normal and attack traffic
(Fig. 3g). We predict that a ML model will be able to
leverage these differences.
IP Destination Address Cardinality and Novelty:
IoT devices are characterized by the limited number of
endpoints with which they communicate [7]. For example, a
WeMo smart switch communicates with only four endpoints
for the purposes of activation/deactivation from the cloud,
retrieving firmware updates, and logging its status. Another
key characteristic of IoT device traffic is that the set of
destination IP addresses rarely changes over time.
We craft two features to reflect this behavior. First, a
count of distinct destination IP addresses within a 10-second
window; more endpoints may indicate attack traffic. Second,
we calculate the change in the number of distinct destination
IP addresses between time windows; new endpoints might
suggest that the device is conducting an attack. Fig. 3h
supports the importance of these two features. Packets
associated with attack traffic are in contact with, on average,
more endpoints. This minor distributional difference can be
leveraged in differentiating normal and attack traffic.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
(e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 3: Comparison of feature statistics for normal versus DoS attack traffic. a) Packet sizes. b–d) Inter-packet intervals
(∆T ), d∆T/dt, and d2∆T/dt2. e–f) Protocol distributions. g) Average bandwidth over 10 second time windows. h) Number
of unique IP destinations in 10 second time windows.
V. RESULTS
A. Classification
We tested five machine learning algorithms to distinguish
normal IoT packets from DoS attack packets:
1) K-nearest neighbors “KDTree” algorithm (KN)
2) Support vector machine with linear kernel (LSVM)
3) Decision tree using Gini impurity scores (DT)
4) Random Forest using Gini impurity scores (RF)
5) Neural Network (NN): 4-layer fully-connected feed-
forward neural network (11 neurons per layer), trained
for 100 epochs with batch size 32 using binary cross-
entropy loss; hyperpameters chosen by optimization
on a validation set
We implemented these machine learning models using the
Scikit-learn Python library [22], except for the neural net-
work, which was implemented using the Keras library [23].
All hyper-parameters were the default values unless other-
wise noted.
We trained the classifier on a training set with 85%
of the combined normal and DoS traffic and calculated
classification accuracy on a test set of the remaining traffic
Table I: IoT Traffic Classification Results
KN LSVM DT RF NN
Precision (Normal) .998 .992 .996 .999 .983
Precision (Attack) .999 .991 .999 .999 .999
Recall (Normal) .993 .870 .993 .998 .989
Recall (Attack) .999 .999 .999 .999 .998
F1 (Normal) .995 .927 .994 .998 .986
F1 (Attack) .999 .995 .996 .999 .999
Accuracy .999 .991 .999 .999 .999
(Table I). The accuracies of our four classifiers ranged from
approximately 0.91 to 0.99. Note that there are almost 15
times as many attack packets as there are normal packets
due to the flooding nature of the DoS attacks. Thus, a naive
baseline prediction algorithm that predicts that all packets
are malicious would achieve a baseline accuracy of 0.93.
The linear SVM classifier performed the worst, suggesting
that the data is not linearly separable. The decision tree
classifier performed well, achieving an accuracy of 0.99,
suggesting that the data can be segmented in a higher fea-
ture space. The K-nearest neighbors classifier also achieved
the same accuracy, suggesting that the two different data
Table II: Feature Importance using Gini Impurity Scores.
Feature Gini Score
Packet Size .510
is HTTP .177
∆T .070
is TCP .068
is OTHER .043
is UDP .041
d∆T/dt .018
d2∆T/dt2 .012
Bandwidth .006
# Destinations .004
∆ # Destinations .003
Table III: Classifier performance, with and without IoT-
specific stateful (temporal) features.
F1 (Normal) KN LSVM DT RF NN
Stateless Features .967 .920 .977 .981 .939
All Features .995 .921 .995 .998 .989
classes clustered well in feature-space. The neural network
performed surprisingly well despite having fewer than half
a million training samples from a 10-minute packet capture.
Given the nature of the algorithm, the neural network
is expected to scale its performance with the amount of
available training data.
B. Feature Importance
The stateless features greatly outperformed the stateful
features, as indicated by Gini impurity score (Table II). We
expected this result, since the differences in the cumulative
distributions of normal and attack traffic were more pro-
nounced than those of the stateless features (Fig. 3). This
result suggests that real-time anomaly detection of IoT attack
traffic may be practical because the stateless features are
lightweight and derived from network-flow attributes (e.g.
5-tuple and packet size).
Incorporating stateful features nonetheless improved ac-
curacy compared to classification with the stateless features
alone (Table III). All of the classifiers experienced a 0.01
to 0.05 increase in F1 score by including stateful features.
This demonstrates that applying domain knowledge about
IoT device behaviors to feature engineering can enhance
DoS detection performance.
VI. DISCUSSION & FUTURE WORK
This preliminary work demonstrates that simple classifica-
tion algorithms and low-dimensional features can effectively
distinguish normal IoT device traffic from DoS attack traffic.
This result motivates follow-up research to evaluate IoT DoS
detection in more real-world settings.
First, we would like to replicate the results of this study
with normal traffic from additional IoT devices and with
attack traffic recorded from a real DDoS attack. This could
involve using published code to create an IoT device botnet
on a protected laboratory network or collaborating with an
ISP to obtain NetFlow records or packet captures recorded
during a DDoS attack. This will be an essential test of the
method’s external validity.
Collecting a larger dataset would also allow us to see
how DoS detection accuracy is affected by the amount
and diversity of IoT traffic. The network behavior of IoT
devices varies widely by device type [7]. We are curious
whether certain types of devices are more amenable to
network anomaly detection, perhaps because their normal
traffic follows more regular patterns, or vice versa.
We would also like to experiment with additional features
and more complex machine learning techniques beyond
those discussed in this paper. We believe that there is great
potential for the application of deep learning to anomaly
detection in IoT networks, especially for detecting attacks
that are more subtle than DoS floods. We hope that this
work inspires further efforts to develop network protection
techniques specifically designed for IoT devices.
It is also an open question how best to intervene once
an IoT device is discovered to be part of a DDoS attack.
Simply cutting the device off from the network might not
be feasible, especially if the device is essential (e.g. a blood
sugar monitor or a home water pump), because many smart
devices do not retain basic functionality without network
connectivity [24]. Notifying the user is an option, but many
users of home IoT devices will be unequipped to perform
device maintenance beyond powering off or disconnecting
the device.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we showed that packet-level machine learn-
ing DoS detection can accurately distinguish normal and
DoS attack traffic from consumer IoT devices. We used
a limited feature set to restrict computational overhead,
important for real-time classifcation and middlebox deploy-
ment. Our choice of features was based on the hypothesis
that network traffic patterns from consumer IoT devices
differ from those of well-studied non-IoT networked devices.
We tested five different ML classifiers on a dataset of
normal and DoS attack traffic collected from an experimental
consumer IoT device network. All five algorithms had a
test set accuracy higher than 0.99. These preliminary results
motivate additional research into machine learning anomaly
detection to protect networks from insecure IoT devices.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank Dillon Reisman, Daniel Wood, and Gudrun
Jonsdottir. This work was supported by the Department of
Defense through the National Defense Science and Engi-
neering Graduate Fellowship (NDSEG) Program, a Google
Faculty Research Award, the National Science Foundation,
and the Princeton University Center for Information Tech-
nology Policy Internet of Things Consortium.
REFERENCES
[1] (2016) Unlocking the potential of the
internet of things. McKinsey & Company.
[Online]. Available: http://www.mckinsey.com/
business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/
the-internet-of-things-the-value-of-digitizing-the-physical-world
[2] (2015) Internet of things research study. Hewlett Packard
Enterprise. [Online]. Available: http://h20195.www2.hpe.
com/V4/getpdf.aspx/4aa5-4759enw
[3] (2016) Internet of things (iot) security and privacy recommen-
dations. BITAG. [Online]. Available: https://www.bitag.org/
report-internet-of-things-security-privacy-recommendations.
php
[4] S. Hilton. (2016) Dyn analysis summary of friday october
21 attack. Dyn. [Online]. Available: https://dyn.com/blog/
dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october-21-attack/
[5] (2016) Threat advisory: Mirai botnet. Akamai.
[Online]. Available: https://www.akamai.com/
us/en/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/
akamai-mirai-botnet-threat-advisory.pdf
[6] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, and V. Kumar, “Anomaly detection:
A survey,” ACM computing surveys (CSUR), vol. 41.3: 15,
2009.
[7] N. Apthorpe, D. Reisman, and N. Feamster, “A smart home
is no castle: Privacy vulnerabilities of encrypted iot traffic,”
2016.
[8] L. Ertoz, E. Eilertson, A. Lazarevic, P.-N. Tan, V. Kumar,
J. Srivastava, and P. Dokas, “Minds minnesota intrusion de-
tection system,” In Data Mining: Next Generation Challenges
and Future Directions, 2004.
[9] E. Eskin, W. Lee, and W. Stolfo, “Modeling system call for
intrusion detection using dynamic window sizes,” 2001.
[10] M. Qin and K. Hwang, “Frequent episode rules for internet
anomaly detection,” 2004.
[11] D. Barbard, J. Couto, S. Jajodia, and N. Wu, “Adam: A
testbed for exploring the use of data mining in intrusion
detection,” SIGMOD, vol. 30:4, 2001.
[12] J. Bigham, D. Gamez, and N. Lu, “Safeguarding scada sys-
tems with anomaly detection,” in Computer Network Security,
V. Gorodetsky, L. Popyack, and V. Skormin, Eds. Berlin,
Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 171–182.
[13] S. N. Shirazi, A. Gouglidis, K. N. Syeda, S. Simpson,
A. Mauthe, I. M. Stephanakis, and D. Hutchison, “Evaluation
of anomaly detection techniques for scada communication
resilience,” in 2016 Resilience Week (RWS), Aug 2016, pp.
140–145.
[14] M. Miettinen, S. Marchal, I. Hafeez, N. Asokan, A. Sadeghi,
and S. Tarkoma, “Iot sentinel: Automated device-type
identification for security enforcement in iot,” CoRR, vol.
abs/1611.04880, 2016. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/
abs/1611.04880
[15] A. Sivanathan, D. Sherratt, H. H. Gharakheili, and A. V.
Vijay Sivaraman, “Low-cost flow-based security solutions for
smart-home iot devices,” 2016.
[16] S. Hao, N. A. Syed, N. Feamster, A. G. Gray, and S. Krasser,
“Detecting spammers with snare: Spatio-temporal network-
level automatic reputation engine,” USENIX security sympo-
sium, vol. 9, 2000.
[17] (2017) Yi home camera. [Online]. Available: https://www.
yitechnology.com/yi-home-camera
[18] (2017) Wemo insight smart plug. [Online]. Available:
http://www.belkin.com/us/F7C029-Belkin/p/P-F7C029/
[19] (2017) Wireless blood pressure monitor. [Online]. Available:
https://health.nokia.com/us/en/blood-pressure-monitor
[20] (2017) Goldeneye code repository. [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/jseidl/GoldenEye
[21] (2017) hping3 package description. [Online]. Available:
http://tools.kali.org/information-gathering/hping3
[22] (2017) Scikit learn: Machine learning in python. [Online].
Available: http://scikit-learn.org/stable/
[23] F. Chollet et al., “Keras,” https://github.com/fchollet/keras,
2015.
[24] N. Apthorpe, D. Reisman, and N. Feamster, “Closing the
blinds: Four strategies for protecting smart home privacy from
network observers,” Workshop on Technology and Consumer
Protection (ConPro), 2017.
